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RECTIFICATION AND PARTY MISDESCRIPTION: TO WHAT EXTENT IS 
RECTIFICATION COMPETENT OR USEFUL? 
R Sharrock∗ 
1 Introduction 
In Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd1 both Judge of Appeal De Villiers and Judge of 
Appeal Kotzé accepted2 that the fact that an incorrectly recorded contract falls into a 
category of contract that legislation requires to be in writing and signed is not, in 
principle, a bar to rectification of the written record. Rectification is competent even 
though the written record, being in need of rectification, ex hypothesi does not 
correctly reflect what the parties agreed upon or intended and, therefore, does not 
comply with the formal requirements of the legislation. 
In the recent case of Osborne v West Dunes Properties 1763 the court was required 
to determine if a written sale of land which named the wrong party as buyer and 
indicated, incorrectly, that the true buyer's agent had signed on behalf of that party 
was capable of rectification. The outcome of the case on the facts appears to be 
correct, but aspects of the court's reasoning are open to criticism. The case provides 
a useful vehicle for discussion of the legal principles governing rectification and party 
misdescription. 
2 The facts 
The property sold was a farm ("Farm 1581 Paarl") situated in the Drakenstein 
Municipality. The price was R17,5 million, of which a deposit of R2,5 million was paid 
upon signature. The seller – presumably the owner of the property (the report is 
silent on this) – was the first defendant (West Dunes Properties 176 (Pty) Ltd), 
represented by the fourth defendant (Le Roux). The second defendant conducted a 
restaurant business and the third defendant a wedding and conference facility on 
∗  Robert Sharrock. BCom LLB (Natal). Attorney and Conveyancer of the High Court of South Africa. 
Professor of Law, University of KwaZulu–Natal. Email: Sharrock@ukzn.ac.za. 
1  Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282. 
2  Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282 290, 294 respectively. 
3  Osborne v West Dunes Properties 176 2013 6 SA 105 (WCC) (hereafter Osborne). 
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the property. The written agreement reflected the buyer as being the second 
plaintiff (PJ Osborne (Pty) Ltd), represented by the first plaintiff (Osborne). Both Le 
Roux and Osborne had signed the document in representative capacities. The 
description of the buyer in the document was as follows: 
PJ Osborne (Pty) Ltd 
Registrasienommer: 2012/036410/07 
Harpuisbos Straat 42, Langebaan 
Kontaknommer: 082 565 5515 
hierin wettiglik verteenwoordig deur Pieter Jacobus Osborne in sy hoedanigheid as 
direkteur en behoorlik daartoe gemagtig. 
The plaintiffs maintained that this description was wrong; the real buyer was not PJ 
Osborne (Pty) Ltd but a registered "shelf company" ("rakmaatskappy") to be 
acquired for the purposes of the contract. 
3 The pleadings 
The plaintiffs claimed delictual damages from the defendants, jointly and severally, 
basing their claim on the alleged failure of Le Roux to disclose certain facts during 
the pre–contractual negotiations. In their particulars of claim the plaintiffs asked for 
rectification of the written agreement by replacing the description of the buyer in the 
document with the following provision: 
Die koper word verteenwoordig deur Pieter Jacobus Osborne. 'n Geregistreerde 
rakmaatskappy sal vir die doel van die koop as koper aangekoop waarna 'n gepaste 
beskikbare naamsverandering en reservering tot die Registrateur van Maatskappye 
gerig sal word. Sodanige maatskappy se naam wat goedgekeur word deur die 
Registrateur van Maatskappye, sal daarna op hierdie kontrak aangebring word 
teenoor die parawe van Le Roux en Osborne.4 
The defendants noted several exceptions to the plaintiffs' particulars of claim. 
4  Translation: The purchaser is represented by Pieter Jacobus Osborne. A registered shelf 
company will be acquired for the purpose of the purchase, after which an appropriate available 
change of name and reservation will be sent to the Registrar of Companies. The company name 
which is approved by the Registrar of Companies will then be inserted into this contract next to 
the initials of Le Roux and Osborne. 
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4 The judgment 
Judge Blignaut found it unnecessary to deal with the exceptions because, in his 
view, the plaintiffs' particulars of claim had four "basic defects" which affected "the 
validity of the … particulars of claim as a whole".5 
The first defect was that Osborne had no locus standi in the proceedings – in other 
words, no right to claim the relief which he sought.6 He had acted merely as the 
representative of the buyer when concluding the contract and paying the deposit 
and, accordingly, had not personally acquired any rights or incurred any liabilities vis 
à vis the defendants.7 In addition, the plaintiffs had not alleged that any legal 
interest of Osborne had been infringed, nor that he had suffered any damage, both 
of which are essential requirements for delictual liability.8 
The second defect was that the "formal agreement of sale" – the expression used by 
Judge Blignaut to describe the agreement of sale as it was recorded in writing9 – 
was "void for vagueness as the alleged true purchaser (the shelf company) [had] … 
not been identified".10 Judge Blignaut applied the principle that the material terms of 
an agreement must be identified with sufficient certainty, failing which the 
agreement is void for vagueness.11 In the present case, a purchaser had been 
adequately identified in the formal agreement of sale but, according to the plaintiffs, 
the real purchaser was the shelf company and its description was so vague that it 
could not be identified at all. The concept of a shelf company had not been defined 
and the relevant shelf company had not been identified by name, registration 
number, or in any other way. The provision to be inserted provided that the shelf 
company was to be purchased at some stage in the future but it did not identify the 
5  Osborne para 20. 
6  Osborne paras 20-21, 26. 
7  Osborne para 22-24. 
8  Osborne para 25. 
9  Osborne para 19. 
10  Osborne para 20. 
11  Osborne paras 27-28. 
2197 
                                        
R SHARROCK PER / PELJ 2014(17)5 
proposed purchaser nor the proposed seller.12 In terms of common law principles, 
the alleged true agreement of sale was therefore void for vagueness.13 
The third defect identified by Judge Blignaut was that the contract was "invalid for 
non-compliance with the provisions of section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 
of 198114 as the true purchaser [had] … not been identified in the formal agreement 
of sale".15 The main points in the judge's reasoning appear to be the following. 
Although the identity of the parties to an agreement is often described as an 
essential term, it is more appropriately described as an "essential part" of the 
agreement.16 The distinction is "normally not of great moment" but it is "useful to 
focus on [it]" when applying section 2(1) of the Act to a claim for rectification 
because "the statute itself uses the term 'parties', as opposed to the term 
'alienation'".17 It is trite law that the written record of an agreement cannot be 
rectified unless it is valid ex facie the document.18 Also it stands to reason that an 
agreement cannot be rectified if that would result in an invalid agreement.19 Section 
2(1) of the Act requires an agreement for the sale of land to be signed by "the 
parties thereto". This phrase, properly interpreted, refers to the true parties to the 
agreement. It is therefore "essential" in a claim for rectification that the true parties 
be identified in the written agreement.20 In the present case, the formal agreement 
12  Osborne para 29. 
13  Osborne para 30. 
14  Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 (hereafter "the Act"). 
15  Osborne para 20. 
16 Osborne para 32. Judge Blignaut cited the following passage from the judgment of Judge Caney 
in Godfrey v Paruk 1965 2 SA 738 (D) 739G-H: "In Fram v Rimer 1935 WLD 5 at p 8, Barry J said 
that the identity of the parties is as much an essential term of the contract as the subject matter, 
and this has been repeated more than once, but with the greatest respect to those who have 
used the expression 'essential term' it appears to me more appropriate to say that the identity of 
the parties is an essential part of the contract, as Horwitz AJ said in Rademeyer v Hughes 1946 
OPD 430 at p 434, they are the parties between whom the terms of the contract have been 
agreed." 
17   Osborne para 33. 
18  The judge referred to Magwaza v Heenan 1979 2 SA 1019 (A); Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd 
v Fowles 1999 2 SA 1045 (SCA) paras 9-10. 
19  Osborne para 34. 
20  In Osborne para 36, Judge Blignaut agreed with the view of Nienaber "Oor die Beskrywing van 
Partye" 258 that: "…die koopkontrak moet geteken word deur die partye daarby en gevolglik 
moet die identiteit en hoedanigheid van die partye 'daarby' blyk. 'Daarby' slaan kennelik op die 
werklike koopkontrak en nie maar net op die formele dokument wat die werklike koopkontrak 
dalk nie korrek weergee nie. In die voorbeelde genoem is die partye bes moontlik partye tot die 
dokument maar hulle is nie partye (in die tegniese sin hierbo genoem) tot die werklike 
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of sale purported to record an agreement between PJ Osborne (Pty) Ltd as 
purchaser and West Dunes Properties 176 (Pty) Ltd as seller, but according to the 
allegations made by the plaintiffs in support of their claim for rectification, no such 
agreement existed. The legal bond, on the plaintiffs' version of events, existed 
between a shelf company as purchaser and West Dunes Properties 176 (Pty) Ltd. 
The formal agreement, thus, failed to identify the true purchaser.21 For this reason 
the formal agreement was incapable of being rectified.22 
The fourth defect identified by Judge Blignaut was that "both the true and formal 
agreements of sale [were] … invalid for non-compliance with [section 2(1) of the 
Act] as neither [had been] … signed by the true purchaser".23 Judge Blignaut 
pointed out that the statutory requirement that the agreement must be "signed by" 
the parties, properly interpreted, refers to the signatures of the true parties to the 
agreement. In the present case, in the absence of the signature of the true 
purchaser, the formal agreement was invalid and therefore incapable of being 
rectified. The true agreement was also not signed by the true purchaser and was, 
therefore, equally invalid.24 A passage from Wulfsohn25 supported this approach. 
The author said that rectification of the description of a party in a sale of land 
"presented a special class of problem because the signatures of the parties are 
required". The author added: 
Thus, B may sign as the purchaser. But the prior oral agreement may have been … 
that A and not B be the purchaser. … A should thus have signed the writing. The 
court will not order A to sign, and A will not be the purchaser, due to the absence 
of his signature.26 
koopkontrak nie. En omdat die identiteit van die ware partye nie in die kontrak self vervat is nie, 
is die kontrak formeel nietig". Judge Blignaut considered that the import of this passage was as 
follows. In terms of s 2(1) of the Act an alienation of land must be signed "by the parties 
thereto". On a proper interpretation of this phrase it necessarily relates to the parties to the true 
agreement and not to the parties to the formal document. As the formal document does not 
identify the true purchaser it is invalid and therefore not capable of rectification. 
21  Osborne para 35. 
22  Osborne para 37. 
23  Osborne para 20. 
24  Osborne para 38. 
25  Wulfsohn Formalities 223. 
26  Osborne para 39. 
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It followed that the formal agreement of sale did not comply with the requirements 
of section 2(1) of the Act as one of the parties had not signed the agreement. This 
was a second reason why the formal agreement was not capable of being rectified.27 
5 Comment 
5.1 Certainty 
This note is concerned with rectification and not contractual certainty, but Judge 
Blignaut's reasoning regarding the element of contractual certainty calls for brief 
comment. The judge appears to have been unsure whether it was the "formal 
agreement" (the agreement of sale as it was recorded in writing) or "the alleged true 
agreement of sale" which had to be sufficiently certain to be enforced.28 Clearly it 
was the latter agreement. The formal agreement had to describe the parties "with 
sufficient accuracy and particularity to enable [their] identity … to be ascertained 
without recourse to evidence of an oral consensus between the parties",29 but this 
was to ensure that the true agreement complied with the statutory requirement of 
writing, not because of any independent requirement of certainty applicable to the 
formal agreement. 
Judge Blignaut concluded that the agreement was uncertain because the real 
purchaser could not be identified. But whether this was correct would appear to 
have been a matter for evidence, for example, of whether the buyer had acquired "a 
registered shelf company" (what the parties understood by this expression) for 
purposes of the contract. It is suggested that a more fundamental legal problem 
facing the plaintiffs was that the real buyer (the "shelf company" which Osborne 
allegedly intended to represent) was still to be acquired when the contract was 
concluded and, therefore, did not exist at that time. It is self-evident that a party 
cannot conclude a contract (or perform any juristic act) for a non-existent principal. 
Section 21 of the Companies Act30 allows an exception to this principle in the case of 
a company that is "contemplated to be incorporated in terms of [the] Act but does 
27  Osborne para 40. 
28  Compare the conflicting remarks in Osborne paras 20 and 30. 
29  Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 938. 
30  Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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not yet exist at the time", but the shelf company in the present case was still be 
acquired (not incorporated), so the statutory exception was not relevant. The 
inescapable result was that no contract was formed between the parties. 
5.2 Rectification of the incorrect description of the buyer 
The conclusion reached by Judge Blignaut was that the formal agreement was 
incapable of being rectified so as to reflect the correct description of the purchaser. 
Judge Blignaut referred to the principle applied in Magwaza v Heenan31 (referred to 
here as the "Magwaza principle") that rectification of a contract which statute 
requires to be in writing and signed is possible only if the document, on the face of 
it, complies with the statutory requirements,32 but the judge evidently considered 
that the principle was not applicable on the facts before him. It is difficult to discern 
a coherent thread in the judge's reasoning on this issue, but he seems to have 
proceeded from the premise that because the identity of the parties should be 
classified as an essential part, rather than merely an essential term, of the contract, 
rectification is not possible in a case of party misdescription unless the true parties 
are identified in the written agreement. 
If this was, indeed, the judge's view, it cannot be supported. The courts have 
accepted that the Magwaza principle is equally applicable where the document 
incorrectly describes a party to the agreement and, in so doing, fails to identify him 
or her. In Lazarus v Gorfinkel,33 Acting Judge Seligson (as he then was) expressly 
acknowledged this: 
In principle I can see no reason why the doctrine of rectification should not be 
applied where a document wrongly records the identity of a party, so as to give 
effect to the intent of the true parties in terms of a prior oral agreement or 
understanding between them. Such a result is quite consistent with the decision of 
31  Magwaza v Heenan 1979 2 SA 1019 (A). 
32  The correctness of the Magwaza principle has been questioned: see, eg, Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 157; De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg 30,323 fn 55; but the courts have followed it 
on numerous occasions and it is firmly entrenched. For recent applications, see Inventive Labour 
Structuring (Pty) Ltd v Corfe 2006 3 SA 107 (SCA) 110 para 6; Reivelo Leppa Trust v Kritzinger 
2007 4 All SA 794 (SE) 796-797; Swanepoel v Nameng 2010 3 SA 124 (SCA) 127-128 paras 15-
17; Lombaard v Droprop CC 2010 5 SA 1 (SCA) 6-10 paras 12-26. 
33  Lazarus v Gorfinkel 1988 4 SA 123 (C). 
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the Appeal Court in Magwaza's case, since there is a formally valid … contract 
which is capable of rectification.34 
It is clear from this passage that there is nothing, in principle, to prevent rectification 
of writing which wrongly records the identity of one of the parties, this being 
consistent with Magwaza's case. It follows that if the incorrectly described party is, 
on the face of it, adequately identified for the purposes of the formalities statute, the 
incorrect description is capable of being rectifiied. In the Osborne case the incorrect 
description of the purchaser, on the face of it, was clearly sufficient to comply with 
the statutory formalities and so rectification of that description was competent. 
It is suggested that Judge Blignaut also erred in adopting the stance that 
rectification is not competent if it will "result in an invalid agreement".35 This view 
misconceives the purpose of rectification, which is merely to remove the disparity 
between the actual agreement and its documentary version. The invalidity of the 
rectified agreement is not, in itself, an obstacle to the granting of rectification, 
although, obviously, it rules out any question of enforcement of the rectified 
agreement. In Akasia Road Surfacing (Pty) Ltd v Shoredits Holdings Ltd36 the appeal 
court applied this reasoning where the contract as rectified would possibly have 
been too vague to be enforced. Judge of Appeal Streicher37 observed: 
Rektifikasie van 'n kontrak het ten doel om die skriftelike dokument in 
ooreenstemming te bring met die ware bedoeling van die kontrakterende partye 
welke bedoeling hulle vanweë 'n gemeenskaplike fout nagelaat het om korrek op 
skrif te stel. Indien daardie ware bedoeling vaag is mag dit die geldigheid van die 
gerektifiseerde kontrak affekteer maar nie 'n verweerder se aanspraak op 
rektifikasie van die kontrak nie. Die reg is immers nie dat effek gegee sal word aan 
'n skriftelike dokument wat die ooreenkoms tussen partye verkeerdelik weergee op 
34  Lazarus v Gorfinkel 1988 4 SA 123 (C) 131. See also Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 
1999 2 SA 1045 (SCA) 1053; Inventive Labour Structuring (Pty) Ltd v Corfe 2006 3 SA 107 (SCA) 
110 paras 5-6. 
35  Osborne para 34. 
36  Akasia Road Surfacing (Pty) Ltd v Shoredits Holdings Ltd 2002 3 SA 346 (SCA). 
37  Akasia Road Surfacing (Pty) Ltd v Shoredits Holdings Ltd 2002 3 SA 346 (SCA) 352 para 14. 
Translation: Rectification of a contract has as its purpose the bringing of the written document 
into harmony with the true intention of the contracting parties, which intention they failed by 
reason of a common mistake correctly to put into writing. If that true intention is vague it might 
affect the validity of the rectified contract but not a defendant's claim for the rectification of the 
contract. The law is not, after all, that effect should be given to a written document which 
incorrectly reflects the agreement between the parties on the ground that the incorrect written 
version does indeed constitute a valid contract while that upon which the parties actually agreed 
does not constitute a valid contract. 
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grond daarvan dat die verkeerde skriftelike weergawe wel 'n geldige kontrak 
daarstel terwyl dit waarop die partye werklik ooreengekom het nie 'n geldige 
kontrak daar kon stel nie. 
5.3 Rectification of the true purchaser's signature 
Judge Blignaut was manifestly correct in holding that without the signature of the 
true purchaser (the shelf company) the agreement would be invalid. As the judge 
pointed out, the requirement of signature by both parties, properly interpreted, 
means signature by the real parties to the agreement, not the persons reflected in 
the document as the parties. It follows that if one of the real parties has not signed, 
then the agreement is void. Signature by the person reflected in the document as 
the party to the contract is legally irrelevant. Rectification of this signature is not 
possible, even if it appears, on the face of it, to be a valid signature, because the 
court cannot, under the banner of rectification, compel a contractant to sign. The 
Magwaza principle does not extend this far. The implication is that even if the 
document is rectified so as to correctly describe the real party, if he or she does not 
sign the agreement is void. The same position obviously obtains where only one 
party is required to sign, as in the case of suretyship or donation. If that party has 
not signed the invalidity cannot be cured by way of rectification, even if the 
document, on the face of it, appears to have been validly signed. 
Was the signature of the true party – the shelf company – present in this case? 
Clearly it was not, because the company was still to be acquired, and therefore 
effectively did not exist, when Osborne signed the document. So even though 
Osborne may have fully intended to sign as agent for the shelf company, his 
signature was a legal nullity. It followed that the invalidity of the agreement could 
not be cured by rectification. The position would have been different had the shelf 
company been duly acquired by the time that signature took place. Wulfsohn,38 in a 
further passage (appearing immediately after the passage cited by Judge Blignaut), 
makes it clear that where the description of a signatory's capacity is incorrect, the 
description may be rectified.39 The author says: 
38  Wulfsohn Formalities 223. 
39 See also Papenfus v Steyn 1969 1 SA 92 (T) 94-98. 
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… A may have signed "for B", whereas in terms of the prior oral agreement A was 
alone to be the purchaser. Again, A may have signed as a party without qualifying 
his signature, whereas in terms of the prior oral agreement, B was the purchaser 
and A was to sign "for B". In such cases, as A's signature is present, rectification 
should be permissible, if the requirements therefor be present, in order to delete 
the words "for B" in the first case, and to add "for B" in the second case, provided 
that, in such latter case, when A signed he was "acting in terms of his written 
authority".40 
The signature of an agent being equivalent to signature by the principal, had 
Osborne intended to sign on behalf of a shelf company already acquired, the shelf 
company would for legal purposes have signed the contract. The physical 
manifestation of its signature (Osborne's signature) would have been on the 
document. Rectification of the incorrect description of Osborne's capacity in such a 
case would have been a viable option. The requirement of acting in terms of written 
authority referred to by Wulfsohn would not have been an obstacle because the 
requirement does not apply where the agent derives his or her authority to sign 
from a source other than authorisation by the principal41 (the position in the present 
case). 
6 Conclusion 
The decision in Osborne raises interesting issues regarding the competence and 
usefulness of rectifying an incorrect party description where the contract is required 
by law to be in writing and signed. It is suggested that when considering this 
question a court should keep in mind the following principles: 
• Where a formalities statute requires signature by the "parties" to the  
agreement (or one of the parties), this means signature by the true parties to 
that agreement, not those reflected as the parties in the written record of the 
agreement. 
• If a party to an agreement required by legislation to be in writing and signed 
has not, in fact, signed the written record of the agreement, the court cannot, 
under the banner of rectification, compel him or her to do so. 
40  Wulfsohn Formalities 223. 
41  See Northview Shopping Centre (Pty) Ltd v Revelas Properties Johannesburg CC 2010 3 SA 630 
(SCA) 639 paras 21-23. 
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• An incorrect party description is capable of rectification, provided the Magwaza 
principle is adhered to. However, the rectification will not rescue the agreement 
from invalidity if the true party is required to sign the written record of the 
contract and has not done so (either personally or through an agent). The 
same applies if the "true party" does not exist and therefore cannot sign the 
document. 
• If an agent has signed the document for one of the contractants and the 
document indicates incorrectly that the agent signed in a different capacity (for 
example, in his or her personal capacity or as the agent for some other party), 
the document may be rectified to indicate the signatory's correct capacity. 
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